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马丁·雅克TED伦敦沙龙演讲:了解中国的崛起
2014-12-18     来源:首都科技网      作者:Martin Jacques
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  在TED伦敦沙龙会上,经济学家马丁·雅克Martin Jacques问:在西方我们对中国和它显著的崛起现象有多少认识?作为《当中国统治世界》的作者,他解释了西方国家常常对中国经济的快速增长力感到困惑的理由,他提出3个基础观点来帮助我们理解当代的中国现实和中国未来的展望。

 

 

演讲原文及对照翻译:

 

The world is changing with really remarkable speed. If you look at the chart at the top here, you'll see that in 2025, these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And if you look at the chart for 2050, it's projected that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And we should bear in mind here that these projections were drawn up before the Western financial crisis. A couple of weeks ago, I was looking at the latest projection by BNP Paribas for when China will have a larger economy than the United States. Goldman Sachs projected 2027. The post-crisis projection is 2020. That's just a decade away. China is going to change the world in two fundamental respects. First of all, it's a huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10 percent a year.

 

世界在变化真是惊人的速度。如果你在这里的顶部图表看,你会看到,在2025年,这些高盛的预测表明,中国经济将几乎同样大小的美国经济。如果你在2050年的图表看,它预计中国经济将两倍于美国经济的规模,和印度经济将几乎同样大小的美国经济。我们应该牢记,在这里,这些预测是西方金融危机前。几个星期前,我一直在寻找在法国巴黎银行(BNP Paribas)的最新预测时,中国将拥有比美国更大的经济。高盛预计2027。危机后的预测是2020年。这只是一个十年。中国正在改变世界,在两个基本方面。首先,它是一个巨大的发展与国家人口1.3亿人,已超过30年增长10%左右的一年。

 

And within a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world. Never before in the modern era has the largest economy in the world been that of a developing country, rather than a developed country. Secondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the world -- which I think is what China will become -- will be not from the West and from very, very different civilizational roots.

 

而在十年内,它将在世界上最大的经济体。以前从未在当今时代是一个发展中国家,而非发达国家,拥有世界上最大的经济体。其次,在当今时代的第一次,在世界上占主导地位的国家 - 我认为中国将成为什么 - 将不从西方非常不同的文明根。

 

Now I know it's a widespread assumption in the West that, as countries modernize, they also Westernize. This is an illusion. It's an assumption that modernity is a product simply of competition, markets and technology. It is not; it is also shaped equally by history and culture. China is not like the West, and it will not become like the West. It will remain in very fundamental respects very different. Now the big question here is obviously, how do we make sense of China? How do we try to understand what China is? And the problem we have in the West at the moment by-and-large is that the conventional approach is that we understand it really in Western terms, using Western ideas. We can't. Now I want to offer you three building blocks for trying to understand what China is like -- just as a beginning.

 

现在我知道这是一个普遍的假设,在西方,作为国家的现代化,他们也西化。这是一种错觉。它的一个假设,即现代性是一个简单的产品竞争,市场和技术。它不也同样是由历史和文化的塑造。中国不是像西方的,它不会成为像西方。它仍将在很基本的方面非常不同。现在这里最大的问题是明显的,我们如何使中国的意义?我们怎样试图了解中国是什么?我们在西方的时刻和大的问题是,传统的方法是,我们理解它确实在西方,用西方的观念。我们不能。现在我想为您提供三个试图了解中国是什么样子的积木 - 就像一个开端。

 

The first is this, that China is not really a nation state. Okay, it's called itself a nation state for the last hundred years. But everyone who knows anything about China knows it's a lot older than this. This was what China looked like with the victory of the Qin Dynasty in 221 B.C. at the end of the warring state period -- the birth of modern China. And you can see it against the boundaries of modern China. Or immediately afterward, the Han Dynasty, still 2,000 years ago. And you can see already it occupies most of what we now know as Eastern China, which is where the vast majority of Chinese lived then and live now.

 

这首先是,中国是不是一个真正的民族国家。好吧,这就是所谓的本身就是一个近百年的民族国家。但谁知道任何有关中国的所有用户都知道,它的很多比这。这是中国一样看着在公元前221年秦王朝的胜利在战国时期的结束 - 现代中国的诞生。你可以看到,对现代中国的边界。或者随即,汉代,仍然在2000年前。你可以看到已经占据我们现在知道作为中国东部,这是其中的绝大多数中国人住那么,现在住的最。

 

Now what is extraordinary about this is, what gives China it's sense of being China, what gives the Chinese the sense of what it is to be Chinese, comes not from the last hundred years, not from the nation state period, which is what happened in the West, but from the period, if you like, of the civilization state. I'm thinking here, for example, of customs like ancestral worship, of a very distinctive notion of the state, likewise, a very distinctive notion of the family, social relationships like guanxi, Confucian values and so on. These are all things that come from the period of the civilization state. In other words, China, unlike the Western states and most countries in the world, is shaped by its sense of civilization, its existence as a civilization state, rather than as a nation state. And there's one other thing to add to this, and that is this: Of course we know China's big, huge, demographically and geographically, with a population of 1.3 billion people. What we often aren't really aware of is the fact that China is extremely diverse and very pluralistic, and in many ways very decentralized. You can't run a place on this scale simply from Beijing, even though we think this to be the case. It's never been the case.

 

现在什么特殊对此的是,给中国它被中国的意义,是什么给中国人什么它是中国人的意识,来自不从近百年来,没有的民族国家期间,发生了什么在西方,但期间,如果你喜欢的文明状态。例如,我想在这里,像祖先崇拜的习俗,是国家的一项非常独特的概念,同样,一个非常鲜明的观念,家庭关系,儒家价值观等方面的社会关系。这时期的文明状态来所有的事情,从。换句话说,中国,不像西方国家和世界上大多数国家,其文明意识,它作为一个文明国家的存在,而不是作为一个民族国家形成。还有另一件事情添加到这个,这是这样的:当然,我们知道中国的大,巨大,人口和地理上,具有13亿人口。我们往往没有真正意识到什么是事实,中国是极其多样且非常多元化,并在许多方面非常分散。您不能运行这样规模的一个地方,简单地从北京,尽管我们认为这是此案。这是从来没有的情况下。

 

So this is China, a civilization state, rather than a nation state. And what does it mean? Well I think it has all sorts of profound implications. I'll give you two quick ones. The first is that the most important political value for the Chinese is unity, is the maintenance of Chinese civilization. You know, 2,000 years ago, Europe: breakdown, the fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire [Roman Empire]. It divided, and it's remained divided ever since. China, over the same time period, went in exactly the opposite direction, very painfully holding this huge civilization, civilization state together.

 

因此,这是中国,一个文明的国家,而不是一个民族国家。是什么意思?我认为,它已经产生深远的影响,各种。我给你两个快速的。首先是为中国的政治价值,最重要的是团结,是中国文明的维护。你要知道,2000年以前,欧洲:击穿,神圣罗马帝国的分裂[罗马帝国]。它分割,它仍然分为以来。中国在同一时期,在完全相反的方向去,非常痛苦控股这个巨大的文明,文明的国家一起。

 

The second is maybe more prosaic, which is Hong Kong. Do you remember the handover of Hong Kong by Britain to China in 1997? You may remember what the Chinese constitutional proposition was. One country, two systems. And I'll lay a wager that barely anyone in the West believed them. "Window dressing. When China gets it's hands on Hong Kong, that won't be the case." 13 years on, the political and legal system in Hong Kong is as different now as it was in 1997. We were wrong. Why were we wrong? We were wrong because we thought, naturally enough, in nation state ways. Think of German unification, 1990. What happened? Well, basically the East was swallowed by the West. One nation, one system. That is the nation state mentality. But you can't run a country like China, a civilization state, on the basis of one civilization, one system. It doesn't work. So actually the response of China to the question of Hong Kong -- as it will be to the question of Taiwan -- was a natural response: one civilization, many systems.

 

二是也许平淡无奇,这是香港。你还记得香港回归,由英国在1997年中国?您可能还记得中国宪法的主张是什么。一个国家,两种制度。我将奠定赌注,在西方几乎没有人相信他们。 “门面,当中国获得这对香港的双手,将并非如此。” 13年,在香港的政治和法律制度是不同的,因为它是在1997年。我们错了。为什么我们错了吗?我们错了,因为我们认为,很自然地在民族国家的方式,。想想德国的统一,1990年。这是怎么回事?好了,基本上西东被吞噬。一个民族,一个系统。这是国家的心态。但你不能运行像中国这样一个国家,一个文明的国家,一个文明,一个系统的基础上。它不工作。因此,事实上,中国的香港问题的反应 - 因为这将是台湾问题 - 是一种自然反应:一种文明,许多系统。

 

Let me offer you another building block to try and understand China -- maybe not such a comfortable one. The Chinese have a very, very different conception of race to most other countries. Do you know, of the 1.3 billion Chinese, over 90 percent of them think they belong to the same race, the Han. Now this is completely different from the other world's most populous countries. India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil -- all of them are multiracial. The Chinese don't feel like that. China is only multiracial really at the margins. So the question is, why? Well the reason, I think, essentially is, again, back to the civilization state. A history of at least 2,000 years, a history of conquest, occupation, absorption, assimilation and so on, led to the process by which, over time, this notion of the Han emerged -- of course, nurtured by a growing and very powerful sense of cultural identity.

 

让我为您提供尝试和了解中国的另一栋建筑块 - 也许不是这样一个舒适的。中国有一个非常不同种族与其他大多数国家的概念。你知道吗,中国13亿,其中超过90%的人认为他们属于同一种族,汉族。现在,这是从其他世界上人口最多的国家完全不同。印度,美国,印度尼西亚,巴西 - 所有这些都是多种族。中国人并不觉得这样。中国真的是唯一的多种族的边缘。所以现在的问题是,为什么?原因嘛,我觉得,基本上是,再次返回到文明状态。一个至少有2000多年的历史,历史上的征服,占领,吸收,消化,吸收等导致的过程中,随着时间的推移,这个汉族的概念出现, - 当然,培育一个增长和非常强大的的文化认同的意识。

 

Now the great advantage of this historical experience has been that, without the Han, China could never have held together. The Han identity has been the cement which has held this country together. The great disadvantage of it is that the Han have a very weak conception of cultural difference. They really believe in their own superiority, and they are disrespectful of those who are not. Hence their attitude, for example, to the Uyghurs and to the Tibetans.

 

现在,这一历史经验的巨大优势,没有汉族,中国可能从来没有一起举行。汉族的身份一直是一起举行了该国的水泥。它的缺点是,汉文化差异的一个非常弱的概念。他们真的相信自己的优势,而且他们是不尊重那些不。因此,他们的态度,例如,维吾尔,藏人。

 

Or let me give you my third building block, the Chinese state. Now the relationship between the state and society in China is very different from that in the West. Now we in the West overwhelmingly seem to think -- in these days at least -- that the authority and legitimacy of the state is a function of democracy. The problem with this proposition is that the Chinese state enjoys more legitimacy and more authority amongst the Chinese than is true with any Western state. And the reason for this is because -- well, there are two reasons, I think. And it's obviously got nothing to do with democracy, because in our terms the Chinese certainly don't have a democracy. And the reason for this is, firstly, because the state in China is given a very special -- it enjoys a very special significance as the representative, the embodiment and the guardian of Chinese civilization, of the civilization state. This is as close as China gets to a kind of spiritual role.

 

还是让我给你我的第三个构建块,中国国家。现在,在中国国家和社会之间的关系是在西方非常不同。现在我们一面倒地在西方似乎认为 - 至少在这些日子里 - 的权威和国家的合法性是一个民主的功能。这个命题的问题是,中国国家享有更多的合法性和权威之一的中国比任何西方国家一样。这样做的原因是因为 - ,有两个原因,我认为。这显然与民主无关,因为在我们的条款,中国当然没有一个民主国家。而这样做的原因是,首先,因为在中国的状态是一个非常特殊的 - 一个十分特殊的意义,为代表,体现和中国文明的监护人,享有的文明状态。作为中国得到一种精神的作用,这是接近。

 

And the second reason is because, whereas in Europe and North America, the state's power is continuously challenged -- I mean in the European tradition, historically against the church, against other sectors of the aristocracy, against merchants and so on -- for 1,000 years, the power of the Chinese state has not been challenged. It's had no serious rivals. So you can see that the way in which power has been constructed in China is very different from our experience in Western history. The result, by the way, is that the Chinese have a very different view of the state. Whereas we tend to view it as an intruder, a stranger, certainly an organ whose powers need to be limited or defined and constrained, the Chinese don't see the state like that at all. The Chinese view the state as an intimate -- not just as an intimate actually, as a member of the family -- not just in fact as a member of the family, but as the head of the family, the patriarch of the family. This is the Chinese view of the state -- very, very different to ours. It's embedded in society in a different kind of way to what is the case in the West.

 

第二个原因是,因为国家的权力,而在欧洲和北美,不断挑战 - 我的意思是在欧洲的传统,历史上对教会,对其他部门的贵族对商人等, - 1,000多年来,中国国家权力并没有受到质疑。它没有严重的竞争对手。所以,你可以看到,在其中的力量已经在中国建造的方式非常不同,我们在西方历史的经验。的方式,结果是,中国有一个非常不同的看法,国家的。而我们倾向于把它作为一个入侵者,一个陌生人,当然是需要限制或界定和约束的权力机关,中国没有看到这样的状态。中国人看来,作为一个亲密的状态 - 不只是作为一个亲密实际上,作为一个家庭的成员 - 不仅在事实上,作为一个家庭的成员,但作为一家之主,家族的族长。这是国家的中国人 - 我们的非常不同。它在社会中的嵌入式的不同类型的方式是什么在西方的情况下。

 

And I would suggest to you that actually what we are dealing with here, in the Chinese context, is a new kind of paradigm, which is different from anything we've had to think about in the past. Know that China believes in the market and the state. I mean, Adam Smith, already writing in the late 18th century said, "The Chinese market is larger and more developed and more sophisticated than anything in Europe." And, apart from the Mao period, that has remained more-or-less the case ever since. But this is combined with an extremely strong and ubiquitous state. The state is everywhere in China. I mean, it's leading firms, many of them are still publicly owned. Private firms, however large they are, like Lenovo, depend in many ways on state patronage. Targets for the economy and so on are set by the state. And the state, of course, its authority flows into lots of other areas -- as we are familiar with -- with something like the the one-child policy.

 

我建议你,实际上是在这里我们要处理的,在中国范围内,是一种新的范式,这是我们在过去的思考从什么不同。知道,中国在市场和国家认为。我的意思是,亚当斯密,已经在18世纪后期的书面表示,“中国市场是更大,更发达和更比欧洲任何复杂的。”而且,除了从毛泽东时期,一直保持更多或较少的情况下,自从。但是,这是一个非常强大和无处不在的状态结合。中国国家无处不在。我的意思是,它的领先企业,其中不少是仍然公有制。的私人公司,但是他们是大像联想,取决于许多方面对国家的乘客量。由国家经济等目标。和国家,当然,它的权威性流入大量的其他领域 - 如我们所熟悉的 - 像一个孩子的政策。

 

Moreover, this is a very old state tradition, a very old tradition of statecraft. I mean, if you want an illustration of this, the Great Wall is one. But this is another, this is the Grand Canal, which was constructed in the first instance in the fifth century B.C. and was finally completed in the seventh century A.D. It went for 1,114 miles, linking Beijing with Hangzhou and Shanghai. So there's a long history of extraordinary state infrastructural projects in China, which I suppose helps us to explain what we see today, which is something like the Three Gorges Dam and many other expressions of state competence within China. So there we have three building blocks for trying to to understand the difference that is China -- the civilization state, the notion of race and the nature of the state and its relationship to society.

 

此外,这是一个非常古老的国家的传统,一个非常古老的传统的治国之道。我的意思是,如果你想说明这一点,长城就是其中之一。但是,这是另一种,这是京杭大运河,建于公元前五世纪,在一审终于完成了1,114英里,连接北京与杭州,上海在公元七世纪。所以这是一个非凡的国家基建项目,在中国,我想帮助我们解释我们今天看到的悠久历史,这是像三峡大坝,并在中国国家竞争力的许多其他表现形式的东西。因此,我们试图来理解上的差异,是中国有三个积木 - 文明的国家,种族的概念和国家的性质及其与社会的关系。

 

And yet we still insist, by-and-large, in thinking that we can understand China by simply drawing on Western experience, looking at it through Western eyes, using Western concepts. If you want to know why we unerringly seem to get China wrong -- our predictions about what's going to happen to China are incorrect -- this is the reason. Unfortunately I think, I have to say that I think attitude towards China is that of a kind of little Westerner mentality. It's kind of arrogant. It's arrogant in the sense that we think that we are best, and therefore we have the universal measure. And secondly, it's ignorant. We refuse to really address the issue of difference. You know, there's a very interesting passage in a book by Paul Cohen, the American historian. And Paul Cohen argues that the West thinks of itself as probably the most cosmopolitan of all cultures. But it's not. In many ways, it's the most parochial, because for 200 years, the West has been so dominant in the world that it's not really needed to understand other cultures, other civilizations. Because, at the end of the day, it could, if necessary by force, get its own way. Whereas those cultures -- virtually the rest of the world, in fact -- which have been in a far weaker position, vis-a-vis the West, have been thereby forced to understand the West, because of the West's presence in those societies. And therefore, they are, as a result, more cosmopolitan in many ways than the West.

 

但我们仍然坚持,和大,在思想上,我们可以通过简单地借鉴西方的经验,通过西方人眼里看着它,用西方的观念来了解中国。如果你想知道,为什么我们准确无误地似乎得到中国错误 - 发生了什么事情发生在中国,我们的预言是不正确的的 - 这就是这个道理。不幸的是,我认为,我必须说,我认为对中国的态度是一种小西方人思维的。它的嚣张。在这个意义上,我们认为我们是最好的,它的傲慢,所以我们的普遍措施。其次,它的无知。我们拒绝真正解决问题的差异。你知道,有一个非常有趣的推移,在一书中,美国历史学家保罗科恩的。保罗科恩认为,西方国家自认为可能是最国际化的所有文化。但事实并非如此。在许多方面,它是最狭隘的,因为200年,西,它不是一个真正需要了解其他文化,其他文明在世界的主导。因为,在这一天结束,它可能,必要时通过武力获得它自己的方式。鉴于这些文化 - 几乎事实上,世界其他地区 - 在一个较弱的位置,面对面西,从而被迫以了解西方,因为西方的这些社会存在。因此,它们是作为一个结果,在许多方面比西方更多的国际大都会。

 

I mean, take the question of East Asia. East Asia: Japan, Korea, China, etc. -- a third of the world's population lives there, now the largest economic region in the world. And I'll tell you now, that East Asianers, people from East Asia, are far more knowledgeable about the West than the West is about East Asia. Now this point is very germane, I'm afraid, to the present. Because what's happening? Back to that chart at the beginning -- the Goldman Sachs chart. What is happening is that, very rapidly in historical terms, the world is being driven and shaped, not by the old developed countries, but by the developing world. We've seen this in terms of the G20 -- usurping very rapidly the position of the G7, or the G8. And there are two consequences of this. First, the West is rapidly losing its influence in the world. There was a dramatic illustration of this actually a year ago -- Copenhagen, climate change conference. Europe was not at the final negotiating table. When did that last happen? I would wager it was probably about 200 years ago. And that is what is going to happen in the future.

 

我的意思是,东亚的问题。东亚:日本,韩国,中国等 - 世界人口的三分之一生活在那里,现在世界上最大的经济区域。 ,我会告诉你,东Asianers,来自东亚的人,比西方对东亚是有关西方的知识渊博得多。现在这一点是很有密切关系的,我很害怕,到现在。由于发生了什么呢?回到图表,在开始 - 高盛的图表。正在发生的事情是非常迅速,从历史来看,世界正在驱动和形状,由旧发达国家,但发展中世界的。我们已经看到的G20 - 篡夺非常迅速G7的位置,或者八国集团。有两个后果。首先,西方国家正在迅速失去其在世界的影响力。有一个戏剧性的例证 - 这其实是一年前的哥本哈根气候变化会议。欧洲并没有在最后的谈判桌上。什么时候,去年发生的呢?我敢打赌,它可能是大约200年前。这是在未来将要发生什么。

 

And the second implication is that the world will inevitably, as a consequence, become increasingly unfamiliar to us, because it'll be shaped by cultures and experiences and histories that we are not really familiar with, or conversant with. And at last, I'm afraid -- take Europe, America is slightly different -- but Europeans by and large, I have to say, are ignorant, are unaware about the way the world is changing. Some people -- I've got an English friend in China, and he said, "The continent is sleepwalking into oblivion." Well, maybe that's true, maybe that's an exaggeration. But there's another problem which goes along with this -- that Europe is increasingly out of touch with the world -- and that is a sort of loss of a sense of the future. I mean, Europe once, of course, once commanded the future in it's confidence. Take the 19th century for example. But this, alas, is no longer true.

 

第二个含义是,世界将不可避免,因此,我们变得越来越陌生,因为它会形文化和经验和历史,我们不是非常熟悉,或熟悉。最后,我恐怕 - 参加欧洲,美国是略有不同 - 但欧洲人和大,我不得不说,是无知的,不知道是世界变化的方式。有些人 - 我得到了一个在中国的英国朋友,他说,“大陆是被遗忘的梦游。”好吧,也许这是真实的,也许这就是一种夸张。但是有这个随之而来的另一个问题 - 欧洲正日益与世界脱节 - 这是一种未来感的丧失。我的意思是,一旦欧洲,当然,一旦指挥未来的信心。例如以19世纪。但是,唉,这不再是正确的。

 

If you want to feel the future, if you want to taste the future, try China -- there's old Confucius. This is a railway station the like of which you've never seen before. It doesn't even look like a railway station. This is the new Guangzhou railway station for the high-speed trains. China already has a bigger network than any other country in the world and will soon have more than all the rest of the world put together. Or take this: Now this is an idea, but it's an idea to by tried out shortly in a suburb of Beijing. Here you have a megabus, on the upper deck carries about 2,000 people. It travels on rails down a suburban road, and the cars travel underneath it. And it does speeds of up to about 100 miles an hour. Now this is the way things are going to move, because China has a very specific problem, which is different from Europe and different from the United States. China has huge numbers of people and no space. So this is a solution to a situation where China's going to have many, many, many cities over 20 million people.

 

如果你想感受未来,如果你想品尝未来,尝试中国 - 有孔老夫子。这是你从来没见过像一个火车站。它甚至没有看起来像一个火车站。这是新的京广铁路高速列车站。中国已经拥有比世界上任何其他国家更大的网络,并很快将超过世界上所有的休息放在一起。或采取这样的:现在这是一个想法,但是它的尝试即将在北京郊区的一个想法。在这里,你有一个megabus上层,怀揣约2000人。旅行轨郊区的道路,它下面的车出行。它速度可达约100英里的时速。现在,这东西要移动,因为中国有一个非常具体的问题,这是不同于欧洲和美国不同的方式。中国有大量的人,没有空间。所以这是一个解决的情况下,中国有很多,很多,很多城市超过20万人。

 

Okay, so how would I like to finish? Well, what should our attitude be towards this world that we see very rapidly developing before us? I think there will be good things about it and there will be bad things about it. But I want to argue, above all, a big picture positive for this world. For 200 years, the world was essentially governed by a fragment of the human population. That's what Europe and North America represented. The arrival of countries like China and India -- between them 38 percent of the world's population -- and others like Indonesia and Brazil and so on, represent the most important single act of democratization in the last 200 years. Civilizations and cultures, which had been ignored, which had no voice, which were not listened to, which were not known about, will have a different sort of representation in this world. As humanists, we must welcome, surely, this transformation. And we will have to learn about these civilizations.

 

好了,所以我会完成吗?那么,我们的态度应该是对这个世界上,我们看到非常迅速地摆在我们面前的发展?我认为它会有好东西,它会有不好的事情。但我想争辩,高于一切,这个世界上的一个大图片积极。 200年,世界基本上是由人口的一个片段。这是欧洲和北美的代表。它们之间38%的世界人口 - - 中国和印度这样的国家的到来,像印尼和巴西等其他代表近200年来的民主化最重要的单一行为。文明和文化,被忽视,没有发言权,没有听取,这是不知道,在这个世界上有代表性的不同类型。作为人文主义者,我们必须欢迎,肯定,这种转变。我们将了解这些文明。

 

This big ship here was the one sailed in by Zheng He in the early 15th century on his great voyages around the South China Sea, the East China Sea and across the Indian Ocean to East Africa. The little boat in front of it was the one in which, 80 years later, Christopher Columbus crossed the Atlantic. (Laughter) Or, look carefully at this silk scroll made by ZhuZhou in 1368. I think they're playing golf. Christ, the Chinese even invented golf.

 

这大船是郑在15世纪初,围绕中国南海,中国东海和横跨印度洋到东非他的伟大航程中,他在航行了一个。在它前面的舟船,其中,80年后,哥伦布横渡大西洋。 (众笑),或者仔细看看这个丝绸滚动株洲于1368年。我认为他们是打高尔夫球。基督,甚至发明了中国高尔夫。

 

Welcome to the future. Thank you.

 

欢迎来到未来。谢谢。

 




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